Rail Is Not a Path to Prosperity for Honolulu

ENERGY.  Rail may be electric but 85% of electricity production on Oahu comes from oil and coal. This won't change much with the current intermittent renewable energy schemes. So rail does not reduce our economic dependency to imported fuels but it increases our dependency to imported sole source equipment and parts for which knowledge base is absent throughout Hawaii.

DEVELOPMENT.  Rail is not needed for TODs and other development. To be done successfully, these need a solid business foundation and strong demand. Neither is present for major development. US Census statistics clearly show that Oahu and Hawaii are in prolonged and perhaps permanent "sideways" trends.  See here [link].  How can a place prosper when prime agricultural land is turned into cookie cutter sprawled homes and fake gentleman farms?

JOBS.  It is bad policy to develop transportation solutions in order to provide jobs, particularly by selecting a type of transportation that will take the transit subsidy share of the city budget from 11% to 19%. This is the path to bankruptcy, not the path to prosperity.

TRANSIT SHARE.  It is counterproductive to develop a form of transportation that will take the current mass transit share from 6% to 7.4% at a cost of over $4 billion for the local economy. Unsurprisingly if one looks at the Final EIS, all freeway and main arterial screen-lines are shown to have similar or worse congestion with rail. Congestion chokes our economy. Fake relief will provide fake results.

CONGESTION.  Honolulu has a modest tax base and it clearly cannot support mega-projects such as the proposed rail. Honolulu has relatively severe congestion because it is among the most lane deficient cities in the union.

ECONOMY.  Despite having the best bus system in the nation and very expensive fuel pricing, the demand for independent travel is very strong, partly due to tourism, military and people having multiple jobs. A single rail line does very little for tourists, too little for people with multiple jobs and nothing for the military.

MOBILITY.  A lot of our traffic is school and college based and rail does really nothing for these trips. Over half of the traffic on the roads is pickup trucks and SUVs of plumbers, electricians, distributors, repairmen and soccer moms. Rail does nothing for them too.

PRODUCTIVITY.  Adding a lot of nothing gets us nothing. In fact the FEIS clearly shows that 70,000 daily riders will switch from bus to rail.  Add a few carpoolers and the 1% who may abandon their car and that's how the rail ridership comes about. Where is the productivity in this?  Even of rail had no construction cost, one would be hard pressed to come up with positive productivity for it.

GUT TheBus.  Last but not least, the rail will dismantle the No.1 system in the nation. All TheBus routes listed below (copied from the rail FEIS) will be terminated at the nearest train station or eliminated altogether: B, C, E, 3, 9, 11, 20, 43, 53, 73, 81, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98A, 101, 102, 103, 201, 202.

An abbreviated TV editorial of this article appeared on Hawaii News Now on October 29 and 30.  Mahalo to Rick Blangiardi, General Manager of KGMB and KHNL for this opportunity.

Bus vs. Rail – 2007 Comparison and 2012 Opinion from Los Angeles

2007

The Gold Line BRT opened in 2003, the Orange Line Rail in 2005. Each is about 14 miles long, and each has 13 stations, about a mile apart. How do they compare?

• The BRT line was expected to start out at 5,000 to 7,500 average weekday boardings, growing to 22,000 by 2020. It actually achieved the 2020 goal by its seventh month.
• The LRT, by contrast, was supposed to start off with 30,000 weekday boardings and double that by 2023. But its actual ridership has been lower than that of the BRT line—well below projections.
• The capital cost of the BRT line was $349 million. The Light Rail cost was $859 million.
• The operating costs also favor BRT, with the Orange Line costing $0.54 per passenger mile compared with $1.08 for the Rail. On a cost per boarding basis, it’s $3.79 for BRT versus $7.54 for Rail.
• Lesson: A high-end BRT is far more cost-effective (bang for the buck) than a typical LRT, meaning you get a lot more transit per dollar spent.
• If a city is short on transit dollars, then a simple express bus service on a major arterial can provide tremendous value per dollar spent.

Source: REASON FOUNDATION’S SURFACE TRANSPORTATION INNOVATIONS ISSUE NO. 45 - JULY 2007

2012

"When you look at the size of Honolulu (and) you look at the transportation problem they're seeking to solve, BRT is almost certainly a better investment,"

UCLA Prof. Brian Taylor said.

Taylor's research shows one of the greatest factors in determining a transit system's appeal is the ease with which riders can get to a transit line, whether it's BRT or rail. If a rider needs to go through various steps like walking, driving or transferring to get to a final destination, the less likely he or she is to use public transportation. "So, making the vehicle a little bit faster is not nearly as important as having a cutting down of the wait time," he said.

While the overall number of projected riders appears impressive, Taylor says it's not nearly enough to offset the tremendous capital cost needed to build the system, as well as the additional expenditures required to operate and maintain it. Heavy rail is much better suited for large, metropolitan cities like Tokyo, New York and London, which generate extremely large numbers of riders.

Source: UCLA expert weighs in on transit debate, Andrew Pereira, KITV

 

Honolulu Transit Megaprojects Compared

The same consultant conducting transit system estimations 6 years apart for the City and County of Honolulu has produced the figures tabulated below.

The conclusion is clear: BRT would provide the same transit ridership for about one tenth the cost.

All these figures are from official Final EIS documents.

 

 The final word is that the Rail Emperor truly has no clothes.

A Train Has the Capacity of Five Buses. So What?

Published on page 3 of Honolulu's Filipino Chronicle.

B, C, E, 3, 9, 11, 20, 43, 53, 73, 81, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98A, 101, 102, 103, 201, 202

The title of this article is not the code for a very nerdy version of the Hawaii-based LOST television series.

These are all the bus routes that will be eliminated or terminated to the nearest rail station. See Final EIS appendix D.

We all know how the public reacted to the relatively manini changes to TheBus last summer. Wait until two dozen routes are drastically changed.

Several of these routes are express providing a competitive service. Many of them are heavily used.

In addition several new and confusing "feeder" routes will be added. So basically the No.1 transit bus in the nation will be dismantled and reconfigured to provide life support for the rail.

Rail's ridership would be much closer to zero than the projected 90,000-some riders per day in the opening year, without dismantling and rearranging the majority of TheBus as we know it today, given that (1) nobody lives at the stations and (2) the whole rail line will have only four park-and-ride lots.

The total bus ridership that will be forced to transfer each day is found on page 46: 69,480 rail riders daily will come from the bus.  That's round trip.

So, over 30,000 bus riders daily will be forced to get out of their bus and transfer to rail going to their destination. They may also need to catch a bus at the other end to get to their final destination (i.e., from Ala Moana Center to UH, Waikiki, and from other stations to all the ridges and valleys that the rail does not serve.)  Coming home they will have the reverse transfers from bus to rail to bus. There will be chaos.

What is the logic of providing such a disservice to the loyal transit riders of TheBus?

In conclusion then, B, C, E, 3, 9, 11, 20, 43, 53, 73, 81, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98A, 101, 102, 103, 201, 202 is the code for transit failure by design in Honolulu.

Fixing the Basics on Rail for Hawaii's Pro-rail Politicians

Full article in Hawaii Reporter. It closes as follows:

If Hawaii's pro-rail politicians are really interested in improving transit in the county of Honolulu, they may begin their education on the history of elevated rail in sunshine cities by simply reading about Miami's Metrorail, and San Juan’s Tren Urbano. Here are a few highlights for Metrorail and Tren Urbano.

Miami’s Elevated Heavy Rail: They got 80% Federal funds but still they run out of money due to cost overruns. (Honolulu gets only 30%).  Ridership forecast was about 200,000 riders (Honolulu's is about 120,000 riders).  When the first segment of the single line opened ridership was only 10,000.  In 1990, six years after opening, it reached only 25% of its forecast ridership or about 50,000! They too ordered trains from Ansaldo and there were allegations of conflicts in the procurement.

San Juan, Elevated Heavy Rail: They got 50% Federal funds but still there was a 74% escalation of construction costs (+74% over budget!)  There was a huge escalation of combined bus and rail operation and maintenance cost after the line was opened. Combined costs shot up by +250%!  There was a downgrade of Puerto Rico’s bond ratings and new taxes were enacted to pay the debt. There was a dramatic decline of total transit ridership (bus and rail) because the train dismantled their bus. It is now more than six years since its opening in 2006 and the train has not reached 50% of its opening year forecast ridership!

Bottom line is that trains are like wind mills. Their theoretical capacity is high and the promises for power and ridership are full of hype.  Once installed reality kicks in and they prove to be only ~25% productive...

Car or Train? The Choice is Yours.

A picture is worth 1,000 words. 

Two pictures are worth 2,000 words.



Picture 1: A 2013 new mid-size car.
















Picture 2: Typical rush hour train commute.












 Any questions?

Island Heavy Rail Calamity: San Juan Repeats in Honolulu

Tren Urbano (or City Train) in San Juan, Puerto Rico is a perfect comparison with Honolulu's heavy rail:

1. Both are heavy rail systems with a very high cost per mile of rail line.
2. Both are systems on similar tourist/agriculture/military island communities.
3. Both are under Federal Transit Administration oversight.
4. Both received US federal funds.
5. Both have the same lead planner, Parsons Brinkerhoff.

I have written in the past about Tren Urbano:

• The Delusion and Deception in Rail Forecasts.
• Honolulu Rail Forecast 2 to 4 Times Higher than Actual Systems.
• Edinburgh Light Rail Halted. The Usual Suspects. The Usual Results.

Recently, Cliff Slater of HonoluluTraffic.com has developed a documented 2-page summary of the consequences of Tren Urbano such as:

• Huge escalation of construction costs (+74%).
• Huge escalation of combined bus and rail operation and maintenance cost after the line was opened (+250%).
• Downgrade of Puerto Rico’s bond ratings.
• Dramatic decline of total transit ridership (bus and rail) because the Tren cannibalized their bus. This is happening to TheBus now.
• It is now more than five years since its opening and Tren has not reached 50% of its opening year forecast ridership! (See link above where I provide comparisons that show HART ridership estimates are 2 to 4 times too high.)

Now all these terrible transit and financial outcomes occurred in San Juan where population is much higher, and average income and car ownership is much lower than Honolulu's (see 2000 data below). The Tren (like history) is repeating itself in Honolulu. The deliberate discounting of history by current elected officials and certain candidates is truly bewildering.

Honolulu Rail Forecast 2 to 4 Times Higher than Actual Systems

The City estimates that TheRail will have a ridership of 116,000 (boardings) in 2030, about 10 years after the system is supposedly completed.

While TheRail is actually a fully elevated, steel-wheel-on-steel-rail heavy rail system, it is designed to fail by combining two poor choices:
(1) It is fully elevated which means it costs well over 5 times the typical light rail system.
(2) It does not use large, heavy rail style, high capacity trains, but smallish light rail trains.
These two choices make it a high cost and low capacity system.

Because of its low capacity, it is comparable to existing light rail systems. The table below includes all US light rail systems that (a) may be characterized as "modern" by having been developed after 1980, and (b) are over 8 miles of length. This comes to 11 comparable systems with route miles ranging from approximately 10 to 42 miles.

The average daily boardings of these 11 existing systems is 38,852 and the average route miles is 28. This yields 1,536 daily boardings per mile or 1,500 boardings per mile for a round number. (Remember we are talking about year 2030 and roughly 20% of TheRail’s users have not been borne yet.)

When one looks at statistics, it is advisable to remove the highest and lowest values and re-check the averages. By doing so for daily boardings and route miles, systems 3, 6 and 9 drop out. The resulting average daily boardings of the eight systems is 37,822 and the average route miles is 27. This yields 1,528 daily boardings per mile. This again rounds to 1,500 so this estimate is quite robust.

Using this estimate of 1,500 times the 20 miles of TheRail yields 30,000 daily boardings. Now let's give a huge break to Honolulu because of the H-1/H-2 congestion, the high cost of living and the higher average density (although high density does not apply west of Middle Street): Let's double this estimate to 60,000 boardings. This will be the likely maximum boardings of TheRail.

What's the City's estimate that FTA approved? 116,000 daily boardings, which is laughable.

Both Parsons Brinkerhoff and FTA received dozens of eggs on their face for the island heavy rail Tren Urbano in San Juan, Puerto Rico where they estimated 80,000 boardings on the opening year and they got 25,000 in 2006.

There is no lesson for PB, FTA and HART to learn. There is no accountability or penalties. They are all dedicated promoters of TheRail. Honolulu's ridership estimates simply prove that history (and unabashed deception) simply repeats itself.

Honolulu Rail Cost Escalation

It is important to understand how much costs escalate in megaprojects. All these costs in bond-financed public projects are to be borne by the taxpayer. Oahu has fewer than 400,000 taxpayers so the possibility of a twelve billion dollar bill for a long rail line presents a staggering liability. Over $30,000 per taxpayer.

In 2005 Mayor Mufi Hanneman and his supporters went to the Legislature and asked for a temporary (20 year) 1% tack on to Hawaii's 4% general excise tax in order to develop a large rail system for an approximate cost of $2.7 Billion. The Legislature approved a 0.5% tack on to the GET in hopes that Federal Transit Administration and other taxes will cover the total. Here is the letter to The Honolulu Advertiser by Mayor Mufi Hannemann promising that the 20 mile system will cost $3 Billion.

In 2008 General Elections there was a City Charter Amendment asking the city to install a steel on steel fixed guideway system. The cost of the 20 mile system had grown to $4.6 billion and almost $1 Billion was the contingency funds. TheBus funds were not touched in 2008.

In 2010 outgoing governor Lingle procured a financial analysis report for the rail that she had supported, in light of the escalating costs of rail and the 2008-2009 fiscal crisis. IDG, a reputable financial and risk analysis consultant based in Washington, D.C., estimated that the 20 mile cost will be more likely $7.2 Billion.

Despite these facts, Governor Abercrombie signed off on the State EIS and Mayor Carlisle dismissed the financial report as "an anti-rail tirade."

In summer 2012 the City submitted its final application to the FTA for a Full Funding Agreement. In it, the cost of the 20 mile line has grown further to $5.17 Billion but contingencies have been reduced to about $600 Million and another $150 Million is "borrowed" from TheBus fleet funds. In other words, the 2012 cost estimate would be $5.7 Billion if they did not fudge the amounts and kept them at the 2008 level.

In May 2012 Councilmember Kobayashi asked HART to estimate the cost of the full 34 mile system from West Kapolei to the UH and Waikiki. HART's response was $9.03 Billion.

If we apply IDG's cost escalation of the 20 mile system to the 34 mile system we get $12.6 Billion. Hanneman's rail has ballooned from $3.6 Billion to $12.6 Billion!


Rail was a bad idea at a cost of $3 Billion. Now that the likely cost is three times higher, the choice is clear. People have made their choice quite clear by handing both mayors Hannemann and Carlisle their walking papers.

Why Rail Is Bad for Honolulu...

I agree!

Honolulu Rail on Trial

Malia Zimmerman interviews Professors Randy Roth (law) and Panos Prevedouros (engineering). In this video filmed on O'lelo's Palolo studio a week ago, Professor Roth correctly predicts the outcome of the State Supreme Court. See below.

Congratulations to Paulette Kaleikini and her native Hawaiian hui for scoring this legal victory: Rail Construction Shouldn’t Have Started, Hawaii Supreme Court Rules. In other words, Mayor Carlisle and HART clearly broke the law.

Ninth Circuit Court Judge Teshima heard the Federal Lawsuit against Honolulu rail. Listen to the YouTube above where I indicate how the attorney for FACE clearly lied to the judge. Professor Roth expects that this lawsuit will also be successful. Decision expected in a couple months.

Faith-based Transportation Policy

Washington Post, George F. Will, A Golden State train wreck, August 8, 2012.

• In faith-based transportation policy, rail worshipers think people will park their cars in Tampa and then rent cars in Orlando.
• California Governor Brown’s reverence for his rail bauble is fanaticism.

How will people in Honolulu

• go to their second job ...
  
• manage their school and job ...
• take kids to school ...
  
• go surfing ...
  
• go eating ...
  
• go to their doctor, hospital, blood test lab, dialysis location ...
  
• do their groceries and run other errands ...
  
• have a diverse and fulfilling life ...
  

... without the independent transportation on roads with cars and buses that serve all neighborhoods?

Railigion is the affliction or belief that most "other people" will be able to use the rail regularly to make the trips that take them to the activities above. This is faith, affliction or outright stupidity. Whatever you call it, professional and responsible transportation planning is not.

Free Bus?

That's a question that comes up often in public forums I attend. Why don't we make public transit like Honolulu's TheBus free?

The Transportation Research Board, a unit of the National Academy of Engineering has just released a report titled Implementation and Outcomes of Fare-Free Transit Systems.

The quotes below help us conclude that tiny systems like the one on the Big Island are better of being free because it costs more to collect money than the money that will be actually collected. Large systems like Honolulu's can't be run for free. They will run out of funds quickly and they'll likely become movable homeless shelters. Recall that TheBus is cutting routes because it cannot afford its fuel bill. Actual ridership of free bus systems also showed that free bus does not translate into less traffic congestion because even at zero cost, too few motorists switch to the bus.

Here are the main findings of the report:

1. No public transit system in the United States with more than 100 buses currently offers fare-free service. (Honolulu TheBus has over 550 buses.)
2. The largest jurisdictions currently providing fare-free service are Indian River County, Florida, and the island of Hawaii, both with populations of approximately 175,000. (The free bus on the Big Island basically transports workers from Hilo to resorts in Kailua-Kona.)
   
3. Fare-free public transit makes the most internal business sense for systems in which the percentage of farebox revenue to operating expenses is quite low. In such cases, the cost associated with collecting and accounting for fares and producing fare media is often close to, or exceeds, the amount of revenue that would be collected from passengers.
4. Providing fare-free public transit service is virtually certain to result in significant ridership increases no matter where it is implemented. Ridership will usually increase from 20% to 60% in a matter of just a few months. (Note: It's worth exploring a low cost bus fare between the Waianae coast communities and the Kapolei transit center.)
   
5. Some public transit systems that have experimented with or implemented a fare-free policy have been overwhelmed by the number of new passengers or been challenged by the presence of disruptive passengers, including loud teenagers and vagrants.
6. Systems offering fare-free service in areas of higher potential demand for public transit need to be aware that increased ridership might also result in the need for additional maintenance, security, and possibly additional equipment to provide sufficient capacity and/or maintain schedules.
7. A relatively small percentage of the additional trips (from 5% to 30%) were made by people switching from other motorized modes. Most new trips were made by people who would have otherwise walked or used a bicycle, or would not have made the trip if there was a fare to pay.

BUS RAPID TRANSIT: Projects Improve Transit Service and Can Contribute to Economic Development

I am pleased to present the summary findings of this hot-off-the-press report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office report to the U.S. Senate.

U.S. bus rapid transit (BRT) projects we reviewed include features that distinguished BRT from standard bus service and improved riders’ experience. However, few of the projects (5 of 20) used dedicated or semi-dedicated lanes— a feature commonly associated with BRT and included in international systems to reduce travel time and attract riders. Project sponsors and planners explained that decisions on which features to incorporate into BRT projects were influenced by costs, community needs, and the ability to phase in additional features. For example, one project sponsor explained that well-lighted shelters with security cameras and real-time information displays were included to increase passengers’ sense of safety in the evening. Project sponsors told us they plan to incorporate additional features such as off-board fare collection over time.

The BRT projects we reviewed generally increased ridership and improved service over the previous transit service. Specifically, 13 of the 15 project sponsors that provided ridership data reported increases in ridership after 1 year of service and reduced average travel times of 10 to 35% over previous bus services. However, even with increases in ridership, U.S. BRT projects usually carry fewer total riders than rail transit projects and international BRT systems. Project sponsors and other stakeholders attribute this to higher population densities internationally and riders who prefer rail transit. However, some projects—such as the M15 BRT line in New York City—carry more than 55,000 riders per day.

Capital costs for BRT projects were generally lower than for rail transit projects and accounted for a small percent of the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) New, Small, and Very Small Starts’ funding although they accounted for over 50% of projects with grant agreements since fiscal year 2005. Project sponsors also told us that BRT projects can provide rail-like benefits at lower capital costs. However, differences in capital costs are due in part to elements needed for rail transit that are not required for BRT and can be considered in context of total riders, costs for operations, and other long-term costs such as vehicle replacement.

We found that although many factors contribute to economic development, most local officials we visited believe that BRT projects are contributing to localized economic development. For instance, officials in Cleveland told us that between $4 and $5 billion was invested near the Healthline BRT project—associated with major hospitals and universities in the corridor. Project sponsors in other cities told us that there is potential for development near BRT projects; however, development to date has been limited by broader economic conditions—most notably the recent recession.

While most local officials believe that rail transit has a greater economic development potential than BRT, they agreed that certain factors can enhance BRT’s ability to contribute to economic development, including physical BRT features that relay a sense of permanence to developers; key employment and activity centers located along the corridor; and local policies and incentives that encourage transit-oriented development. Our analysis of land value changes near BRT lends support to these themes. In addition to economic development, BRT project sponsors highlighted other community benefits including quick construction and implementation and operational flexibility.